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Abstract
Universal exhibitions are almost exclusively described as representations of an
outside reality. The authenticity of the exhibits and the relation between the
display and the real thing are put into consideration to investigate the political
aims and ambitions of the organizers. However, the records of the spectators
show that these were more likely to evaluate the objects according to other
criteria. Here exhibitions reveal themselves as events that were not judged in the
first place for their capacity to represent but for their ability to create. Visitors used
them to develop pleasing mental images according to their individual and
hedonistic motivations. In this sense, the exhibitions did not so much hint back
to the outside than rather hint forward to an evolving imaginary inside the viewer.
Thus, the paper focuses on the Paris Universal Exhibition of 1867 to explore how
and to what purpose the spectators dealt with what they saw. My aim is to analyze
exhibitions as independent imaginary worlds, which serve as starting points for
creative cultural actions that are very little concerned with the realness of the
display.
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Heterotopia
The designation Exposition universelle perfectly captures the nature of the 1867 exhibition: its
task was the complete representation of the world. The exhibition was to unite ‘as far as
possible, works of art, the industrial products of every country and in general the products of
each branch of human activity’ (La Commission Impériale (ed.) 1867: 2).1 The self-imposed
ambition to study the world as an indivisible unity led to the construction of a micro-cosmos,
which understood itself as a representative substitute for the world that surrounded it.
We may borrow Michel Foucault’s term heterotopia to describe the Universal Exhibition
of 1867, as an ‘external space’ (Foucault 1986: 23), with the unusual trait of being ‘in relation
with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspend, neutralize, or invert the set of relations
that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect’ (Foucault 1986: 24). While Foucault does not
cite world exhibitions as examples of heterotopias, his definition of this concept fits them in an
ideal-typical manner. They were ‘real places […] which are something like counter-sites, a kind
of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within
the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are
outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality’ (Foucault
1986: 24).
A heterotopia is a place that understands itself as representative of as many other places
as possible, precisely as the exhibition understood itself as representative of the world around
it. The Exhibition of 1867 established ‘a sort of systematic description […] of these different
spaces, of these other places. A sort of simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space
in which we live’ (Foucault 1986: 24). In this sense, the Exposition universelle de 1867 can be
described as the ‘absolutely universal form of heterotopia’ which Foucault thought did not exist
(Foucault 1986: 24). The exhibition was ‘capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several
spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible’ (Foucault 1986: 25).
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The rejection of all thematic limitations led to the construction of a model of the world.
The spatial arrangement of exhibits could not be accidental: it had to make sense for all the
participating nations and provide structure to the world of the exhibition as a conceptual whole.
On that basis Timothy Mitchell argues that Universal Exhibitions thus generated an
‘unprecedented effect of order and certainty’ (Mitchell 1992: 290) that proclaimed nothing less
than human mastery and control of the world. To what extend the exhibition’s public understood,
accepted and incorporated that vision is the topic of this paper.
Inevitably, the display was very much based on a specific ideological vision of the world.
The aim was not, however, to show an image of the world to be compared with other possible
images. The intention was to create, with the help of proven experts from all fields, a
reconstruction of human civilization anchored in recognized scientific findings; empirical
comprehensiveness was to prove the veracity of the objects displayed (Greenhalgh 1988: 87).
The organizers saw themselves as agents whose task was to concretize objective, scientific
truth by the means of representative objects. The exhibition claimed to be a truthful and valid
image of the world, not an individual vision of it.
The classification system used at the Exposition universelle de 1867 - unique in its
theoretical rigour and thus in the history of international exhibitions - illustrates this positivist
claim. This system reflected ‘considerations of a philosophical nature, with encyclopaedic
intent, whose ambition is to frame the totality not only of industrial production but of everything
peculiar to human activity’ (Rasmussen 1992: 24). Objects from forty-nine participating nations
were subdivided into ten groups and ninety-five classes and arranged within the exhibition hall
in such a way that exhibits of the same type but different national origins could be compared as
easily as possible. This classification system formed the schema into which the world was
squeezed for the duration of the exhibition.
The idea of progress served as the criterion for comparison, with the help of which each
nation’s rank within the supposedly universal civilization should be determined. The fundamental
functional mechanism of civilization was to be rendered observable and, by consequence,
comprehensible. Thus, the exhibition understood the world as principle, not the world in a
moment-to-moment, transitory condition. Planning for the exhibition went ahead regardless of
changes in the wider world. The protracted war in Paraguay and the far-reaching consequences
within Europe of the German-Austrian war of 1866 had practically no effect on the exhibition
concept. Changes in the world itself did not inspire changes in the exhibition that was meant to
represent it (Tenorio-Trillo 1996: 3–9).
The Exposition universelle de 1867 was the most consistent attempt ever made to
literally create a world exhibition. Yet its hermetic model was characterized by manifold
ruptures. The organizers’ absolute commitment to completeness meant that the 150,000m2
Palais d’Exposition lacked, by a long stretch, sufficient space to house all the exhibits, a feat
it had managed during the three previous forerunner exhibitions. As a rather coincidental
consequence 1867 featured the use of the first park within a Universal Exhibition and the
invention of the National Pavilion as its most striking display technique. This opening up of the
space coloured the perception of the visitors as much as the broader model that fundamentally
informed the exhibition.
Any attempt to depict the Exposition universelle de 1867 in its entirety must be both wide-
ranging and highly selective. The subject of enquiry is, on the one hand, because of the
exhibition’s ambition to universality, the largest that one could imagine: the world as a whole.
On the other hand, the exhibition constitutes a clearly defined research subject, both spatially
and temporally, one that brought together the whole world in approximately 450,000m2 over 217
days. The universe was condensed in one place, the Parisian Champ de Mars, and within a very
short period of time, between April 1 and November 3, 1867.
This paper’s methodological response to the simultaneous immensity and minimalism
of the exhibition is comparable to Fernand Braudel’s call for a histoire totale. By taking into
account various temporal axes (longue durée, histoire lentement rythmée, histoire
événementielle), Braudel attempted to develop a mode of historical writing capable of
describing a historical constellation in all its facets, and thus to capture it in its totality. Braudel
was convinced that one could get at the historical character of an event only by eschewing
tearing it bodily from its context (Braudel 1969b: 12; Braudel 1969a: 54-5; Braudel 1979a: 13,
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16-7, 640, 644; Braudel 1979b: 8; Braudel 1979c: 7-8).
It was in fact the micro-history developed in Italy and France that went furthest in
responding to Braudel’s plea. The description of a context of signification in its entirety ultimately
demanded a highly specific object of study; total history was possible only through examination
of the very small (Ginzburg 1993: 171-2). This emphasis on small units, such as villages or
individuals was, on the one hand, intended to render visible microstructures which super-
ordinate concepts such as modernization and industrialization failed to capture. On the other
hand, micro-history aimed to cast more light on the particular motives of specific actors, not least
in their irrationality and in light of their emotional content. This type of history approached society
not so much as a structure super-ordinate to the individual, but as the continuous interaction
of specific actors in narrow confines.
The attempt to comprehensively describe the Universal Exhibition of 1867 compels one
to respond in a similar way, by concentrating on the micro level of the exhibition grounds and
leaving aside the question of how representative this ‘copy’ actually was. Ignoring the world
outside the exhibition can be justified both pragmatically and methodologically. One cannot
hope to do justice to the historical situation of all forty-nine participating nations in the 1860s or
even for the single year of 1867, not to mention the highly comprehensive colonial exhibitions
that would demand additional attention. Such a venture would be all the more illusory in that the
exhibition also aimed to include the history of all the nations presented. The Universal Exhibition
attempted to do nothing less than represent the historical development of civilization from pre-
history to 1867.
This paper does not tackle the question of how typical the Exposition universelle de 1867
was of its time (Purbrick 2001: 1-25). Clifford Geertz has convincingly shown the danger of the
symbolic super-elevation of a single example to the level of a model of an all-embracing totality.
Instead, Geertz calls for ‘thick description’. He rejects a ‘microcosmic model’, summed up in the
phrase ‘Jonesville-is-the-USA’. For Geertz, this involves a methodological ‘fallacy’, namely that
the chosen example is representative of more or of something other than itself (Geertz 1993:
21-2). Yet this is to tacitly assume that which should be proven through analysis of the particular
topic. An approach of this kind not only pre-empts is own results, but makes the anticipated
result the analytical point of departure. This is methodologically flawed even when the object
of analysis itself makes a claim to universally valid representation, as the Universal Exhibition
of 1867 did. Geertz thus urges us ‘not to generalize across cases but to generalize within them’
(Geertz 1993: 26).
Representativity
It would be a fool’s game to repeat here the mistakes of the organizers by viewing the exhibition
as a copy of the world in order to then examine aspects of that world through the ‘representative’
exhibition. Rather, this paper recognizes the microstructures of the exhibition grounds and
investigates how this particular model of the world functioned. Its multiple semantic structures
can best be grasped by concentrating on presence at the Champ de Mars. That is: the presence
of the organizers’ intentions, the media display and its production of an exhibitionary world and
the visitors’ experience of these. This simultaneity constituted the exhibition experience as
distanced opposition of object and observer. The exhibits’ representativity of the wider world
was of secondary importance with regards to perception and interpretation. Inside the exhibition
grounds, the observer was unable to experience the object’s relation to the outside world in any
concrete way.
There are several reasons for this. To begin with, exhibits were chosen according to their
capacity to illustrate the fundamental components of human civilization. Their potential for
abstraction and synthesis was crucial to condensing the world spatially and temporally, as the
exhibition demanded. Enabling people to recognize objects, nations or industrial sectors was
of secondary importance. Most exhibits were individual, manually built pieces which, far from
illustrating an entire industrial sector, were to represent the cutting edge of progress within each
sector. They should embody that which was possible and achievable in 1867, the provisional
end of a developmental line that was presented as progress. By capturing the exhibits
ideologically and putting them on splendid display as luxury goods, they were isolated from their
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context and inscribed within the self-referential frame of the exhibition, within which they took
on a specific meaning.2
Furthermore, emphasis was not placed on the exhibits’ functional character. The
relations of production that generated them, the social context of their manufacture, their
functionality and their spread and accessibility among the wider population – all were ignored.
Within the confines of the Champ de Mars, the exhibits’ links with the world outside, which they
were alleged to represent was neither explicit nor evident (Purbrick 2001: 2, 17).
The issue of the exhibits’ representativity was pushed aside in favour of their significance
as milestones in the triumphal march of progress. Within the exhibition, visitors found no
alternative models for verification or falsification. Comparison, a fundamental principle of the
exhibition promoted throughout the Champ de Mars, was possible only with other exhibits, not
with the world beyond. The exhibition proclaimed in an almost totalitarian manner its intention
to represent the world in its entirety. It asserted its own capacity to explain the world and thus
had no need to consider concrete links with the wider world.
Above all, one must take into account that, though it claimed not to be, the exhibition was
clearly utopian in orientation; it tried to ‘say everything about everything, in order to model the
future in its entirety’ (Ory 1982: 22). Most exhibits were anything but typical of the subject
represented. The model workers’ houses, which in no way reflected the living conditions of
French workers, are a prime example. Here, the elite of the Second Empire laid bare its notion
of an ideal social order. This promised workers a life of modest material prosperity, achieved
through paternalistic welfare and surveillance, in which they would benefit from benevolent
supervision by their employers and the state (Bennett 1995: 22, 47; Foucault 1999: 24; Rydell
1993: 9; Purbrick 2001: 5). There was no sign, in the Champ de Mars, of destitution, difficult
working conditions or poor wages. Unsurprisingly, the exhibition organizers were primarily
concerned to construct an exhibitionary world that flattered their self-perception.
This meant that the representativity of this collection of outstanding objects was largely
ignored. Moreover, widely known facts were systematically denied within the grounds of the
exhibition, which was arranged as a conflict-free, harmonious world. The organizers made the
Exposition universelle, erected on the training grounds of the Military Academy, a symbol of
world peace, and this at a time when the people of France were haunted by the spectre of a war
with Prussia that might begin at any time.
The exhibition’s appearance as oversized pleasure park also tended to place the issue
of the exhibits’ representativity on the back burner. As described, 1867 was the first time that
the organizers were compelled to go beyond the confines of a single building. From this point
on, internationalexhibitions became open-air events. Following the financial losses endured at
the 1855 exhibition, the organizers thought hard about how to make the event profitable, that
is, how to attract as many visitors as possible. Creating a spectacle and entertaining the masses
were thus key concerns, the park forming the epicentre of the organizers’ efforts. The park was
to fascinate and bewitch the visitors; it was to wrench them out of their everyday life, not to
reproduce it.
We must therefore view the exhibition primarily as a self-contained experiential world,
not as a more or less successful copy of the world and shape analytic tools in accordance with
that. The exhibition, which saw itself as a representative heterotopia embracing all persons,
places and times, could not base itself on a world outside, however understood. Just as Edward
Said, in his book Orientalism, investigates the structures of signification and functional patterns
of a discourse and not its relation, however conceived, to the ‘real’ (Said 1995: 5) Orient, this
article probes the structures and semantics generated independently within the Universal
Exhibition of 1867.
The exhibition claimed to be able to represent the world in its historical entirety; its
connection to the world in 1867 had thus to be ignored. In light of this insight, Timothy Mitchell,
examining the world exhibitions of the nineteenth century, has radically called into question the
division between original and representation: ‘[t]he exhibition persuades people that the world
is divided into two fundamental realms - the representation and the original, the exhibit and the
external reality, the text and the world’ (Mitchell 1988: 29). Once this representation was
presented as complete, not as an aspect of a reality lying beyond it, this paradoxically implied
that ‘outside the world exhibition […] one encountered not the real world but only further models
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of representations of the real’ (Mitchell 1988: 12; Mitchell 1989: 224).
Thus, the exhibition took on an independent reality which this paper understands as the
experience of the exhibition. However, this micro-history of the Universal Exhibition of 1867, in
contrast to other micro-historical studies, does not directly bring the various actors under the
spotlight. The individual disappears among the thousands of organizers, the 52,200 exhibitors
and the more than eleven million visitors.
Organizationally, the exhibition took on a dynamic of its own from the very beginning, as
a result of the organizers’ having allowed far too little time for planning; they struggled to keep
up. The various conflicting interests together with financial and logistical problems caused ever-
worsening organizational delays; these in turn produced unique challenges that took on their
own momentum. The organizers were far from having total authority over the exhibition. They
in fact tried, wringing their hands all the while, to keep abreast of this enormous undertaking.
Already at this point, the objects of the exhibition prove to be independent bearers of
meaning between organizers and visitors. The world of objects on display was not so much the
result of strictly implemented plans as of a plethora of unforeseen necessities and pragmatic,
stopgap measures. The way the exhibition finally turned out matched no-one’s intentions
exactly.
Within this microcosm, the human being seems to have been caught in a permanent
state of participation and non-participation. As the protagonist of the process of civilization, he
was the topic of an exhibition, created by humans to be seen by as many other humans as
possible. Yet he had first to step inside this world, though it was dedicated to him and presented
as a result of his inherent nature. The human being then saw exhibits which symbolized nothing
other than himself, catching sight of them from an unbridgeable distance, and, by thus looking
at them, was invited to grasp his own nature (Bancel et al. 2002: 10, 17).
My research is therefore primarily concerned with the simultaneity of overlapping medial
entities and the perceptual practices that these gave rise to. In relation to the latter, sources -
such as diaries or private correspondences - not written specifically for the exhibition or which
were not intended for publication reveal two key facts: the visitors’ perception and interpretation
revolved neither around the issue of representativity nor the intentions of the organisers. The
initial impression is rather one of enormous discursive diversity.
This diversity of impressions is rooted in the polysemy of each object, which was at the
same time a material expression of the organizers’ intentions and convictions, an element within
the staging of the exhibition and the basis of visitors’ interpretations. Therefore, no object on
exhibition could develop a uniform symbolism valid for all spectators. On the contrary, the
exhibits allowed and stimulated quite different readings.
One must therefore distinguish between the organizers’ intentions and the medium that
was to display these intentions, as well as between the display and the perception of the visitors.
In his historical studies of reading behaviour Roger Chartier calls for a clear tripartite division
into text, book and reading, in which the material bearers of signification are allocated an
autonomous and equal place as medial entity between author and reader. These three spaces,
‘in which meaning is constructed’ (Chartier 1989: 1513), must be carefully separated. In a very
similar manner, the world of objects on the Champ de Mars produced its own pattern of
communication (Davallon 1999: 18). The visitor interacted singly and alone with this pattern,
and not with the unseen organizers. In a situation that Eilean Hooper-Greenhill has described
as typical for mass communication (Hooper-Greenhill 1994: 36), the exhibits threw the visitor
back upon himself (Davallon 1999: 29).
This simultaneity of discourses was already a core principle of the exhibition of 1867.
Thus, the transitions of and ruptures within the message between sender (organizers), medium
(exhibits) and receivers (visitors) are of particular interest. By analyzing these, we can hope to
explain the fundamental discrepancy between the organizers’ intentions and the visitor’s
interpretations as observed in the sources for 1867. Examination of visitors’ perceptual
practices lays bare that even in that early time of the modern museum we are not dealing with
a straightforward intention-result chain. The most productive means of grasping the reality of
the exhibition as experienced by the visitors is to examine why such a multiplicity of autonomous
discourses arose within the Exposition universelle de 1867.
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Semantic rupture I: from organizer to medium
Here the emphasis is on the transition from the organizers’ intentions to an autonomous world
of objects with an independent structure of signification, which was anything but a material
reflection of the organizers’ image of the world. The question is: why did the then biggest
exhibition in history, organized with the help of exceptional financial, logistical and political
means, fail to communicate the organizers’ message to the public in unsullied form?
An initial clue is the differing emphasis placed on the terms exposition and universelle:
the latter received significantly more attention than the former. While the organizers went to
great lengths, in diplomatic correspondence over a number of years, to encourage as many
nations as possible to take part, and had no compunction about arranging displays at short
notice to represent non-participating countries such as China and Mexico, they paid little
attention to which criteria should inform such staging. Apart from the classification system, the
organizers produced no documents laying out the theoretical bases and intellectual goals of
their exhibitionary practice. Rather, without theoretical ado, they set about making the event
happen, ignoring its problematic as a media.
The placing of exhibits within the rigidly structured classification system was marked by
a highly pragmatic approach. As a consequence, the issue of how, concretely, to display the
exhibits, was pushed to the background, as was that of their interaction (across thematic
sections) within the exhibition. This was partly a result of the continuous planning delays that
characterized the preparatory phase from beginning to end. When on June 22 1863 Napoleon
III announced plans for a Universal Exhibition in 1867 – no reason for this date proved
forthcoming – the organizers began a race against time, which they ultimately lost. When the
exhibition opened on April 1 1867, many exhibits were still packed in boxes; some of the
buildings in the park opened only months later.
The participant nations’ lack of initiative was largely responsible for this. Each nation had
been asked to appoint regional exhibition committees, which were to select exhibits and then
transfer them to a national exhibition committee for transportation to Paris. Lack of interest,
financial and logistical constraints and, not least, the major problems experienced by the central
exhibition committee in Paris, which had to coordinate all these procedures, created mounting
delays, forcing the organizers to come up with pragmatic, stopgap measures in order to ensure
that the exhibition opened on time, a topic the Paris press had been speculating about wildly
months before the opening date. At the expense of careful planning the exhibition increasingly
took on a dynamic of its own.
The often clashing interests of the various exhibition committees, which numbered in the
hundreds, further intensified this process. Ultimately, the invited nations did not come to Paris
to contribute to the self-glorification of the Second Empire, which presented itself as the leader
of universal progress; rather, they pursued their own goals. Above all, the interests of the
individual exhibitors - selected by the different national committees - were opposed to noble
visions of an international peace festival, civilizational stock-taking, paternalistic concern for the
working classes and global exchange of the latest scientific findings. They wished mainly to
promote and sell their products.
This striking conflict of interests became clearly apparent in the ban on selling exhibits,
shyly announced by the Commission Impériale only a few weeks before the opening date and
coming as a great surprise to the exhibitors, given that contracts had already been signed. The
exhibitors, whose main reason for taking part had just been rendered null and void, then
dragged out the installation of their exhibits and provoked additional delays. They arranged their
products in the most spectacular manner possible, in order to attract more public attention than
their competitors and waited until the last minute to unveil their exhibits, in order to ensure that
no-one else could copy them. Furthermore, the organizers had provided the exhibitors with no
regulations to guide their displays, other than allocating them a particular location. This led to
a huge diversity of exhibitionary forms and hindered the formation of a uniform image right from
the start.
The semantic rupture between the intended discourse and that which was actually
implemented is anchored in the clash between the two fundamental imperatives that marked
the exhibition: the demand for a scientifically verifiable universality on the one hand and the
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constant concern over profitability on the other. As financial rewards could be ensured only by
appealing to a wide public, the key need was to make the exhibition as attractive and spectacular
as possible. During the course of the seven months that the exhibition was held, the spectacle
clearly gained the upper hand over the scientific ambition to present a comparative view of the
progress of human civilization. In the final months, many exhibitors vacated their sections and,
through unofficial channels, rented them to travelling entertainers and innkeepers. The world’s
exhibition became ‘the world’s inn’ (Basch 1869: 107).
The organizers, who attempted to control the exhibits spatially, temporally and functionally
through the strict classification system, through special historical sections and by rewarding the
best objects, nonetheless failed in this task. The lack of a concept of exhibitionary mise-en-
scène allowed for the juxtaposition of independent attractions, which many visitors failed to get
the hang of. The lack of information displays and the failure sufficiently to distinguish between
exhibit and aesthetic ornament also contributed to the development of an autonomous medial
discourse, which pushed the authors’ intentions into the background (Richards 1990: 27). Thus,
the intention of the French organizers was clearly visible only at one single moment of the
exhibition: the festive awards ceremony on July 1 1867 held at the Palais d’Industrie on the
Champs Elysées. For only here could the influence of medium and visitors be suppressed, by
exercising total control of the proceedings and by firmly fixing the 20,000 invited guests in the
places allocated to them.
However, the organizers’ intentions were not entirely washed away within a media
display marked by numerous chance happenings. This was chiefly because of the exhibits that
were not to be seen at the Champ de Mars, despite the relentlessly asserted pretension to
completeness. Territories such as Guatemala and Korea were nowhere to be seen; wilderness
and unsullied nature were likewise absent. No mention was made of topics such as sexuality,
love and death or of professions such as housewife or prostitute. Of beggars, the unemployed,
cemeteries, banks and prisons there was no sign. The omission of these topics prevented the
development of a coherent social critique within the universal harmony presented (Abercrombie
and Longhurst 1998: 13).
This is one aspect of the exhibitionary complex as described by Tony Bennett. The
Universal Exhibition ‘produced a position of power and knowledge in relation to a microcosmic
reconstruction of a totalized order of things and peoples’ (Bennett 1995: 97). Within this
structure, the organizers attempted to establish their political convictions as scientifically
verifiable truth and thus to strengthen their own power in the long-term. With the help of an
autonomous exhibition police force, a superbly equipped medical service and a comprehensive
collection of rules, they created a ‘complex of disciplinary and power relations’ (Bennett 1988:
73), intended to help order and control passage. The Universal Exhibition, as ideal typical
museum of human civilization, also had a normalizing function as explicatory model of the world
(Barth 2007a; Foucault 1999: 48; Bennett 1988: 76-8; Bennett 1995: 102). The arrangement
of objects drew on a homogenous model of society that allocated to everyone a clear position
and specific function. The exhibition was ‘simultaneously ordering objects for public inspection
and ordering the public that inspected’ (Bennett 1988: 74).
Within this complex, which aimed primarily to ensure security and public access to the
medium, the visitor gained nonetheless, and far more than Bennett admits, substantial room for
manoeuvre. This originated in the individual choice of route through the enormous grounds. It
was also the product of a whole series of chance events arising from the colourful, noisy hustle
and bustle of the masses and the ever surprising confrontation with the most diverse exhibits
from all over the world. It is going too far to describe the roughly 50,000 visitors who shoved their
way through the exhibition every day as an ’ordered crowd’ (Bennett 1988: 85) or even a
‘controlled collective’ (Purbrick 2001: 14).
The structure of this exhibitionary complex was in fact far from being so rigid as to deprive
visitors of any means which they could take up and use to their own ends. In another context,
Alf Lüdtke has described this as ‘Eigensinn’ (willfulness). By this he refers to social actors’ efforts
to break out of a structured space of signification and escape its compulsions and constraints
in order to satisfy one’s ‘demand for a space of one’s own’ (Lüdtke 1993: 139). Eigensinn thus
points to the search for room for individual action within a given structure and power relation.
This should not be seen primarily as a form of resistance but as the opening up of a space for
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action, within which personal interests, with no direct relation to the function or aims of the
structure, can be satisfied. This analysis corroborates Abercrombie and Longhurst’sinvestigations
of modern mass audiences (Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998: 30).
The exhibitionary structure, designed to entertain as well as to inform and within which
visitors could peruse whichever objects took their fancy, did not exercise a disciplinary effect
of such severity as to ram the organizers’ ideological aims down visitors’ throats. The Exposition
universelle de 1867 opened up multiple spaces of Eigensinn, anchored in the semantic ruptures
between the varied media discourses, which allowed the visitors to interpret the exhibits as
something other than yardsticks of progress or advertisements for national power and potential.
Thus, both the authors’ intentions and the collection of objects that constituted the
Universal Exhibition as medium form two distinct structures of signification, both of which
warrant equal consideration if we are to get to grips with the exhibition. The medial discourse
appears so important because the visitors came into contact only with the exhibit and not with
the organizers. The organizers were unaware that a statement changes, or becomes changeable,
at the moment of its representation through a medium; thus they opened up room for divergent
interpretation.
Semantic rupture II: from medium to visitor
Visitors did not simply recognize and adopt the medium’s structures of signification. The lack
of a pre-established route of perusal and of explanatory texts next to the exhibits, containing
specific information, further encouraged people to come up with independent interpretations.
Spectators had to identify the exhibit, anchor it in the overall context of the exhibition and subject
it to personal evaluation. This last was necessarily rooted in individual interests and preferences,
but also in factors such as one’s mood at the moment of looking. Falk and Dierking speak in this
context of ‘the important role played by prior knowledge, interest, and the museum experience
itself, as well as the unpredictable but important role of subsequent experiences’ (Falk and
Dierking 2000: 7) for the interpretations of museums, a point further stressed by Hooper-
Greenhill (Hooper-Greenhill 1994: 51). Since the exhibition was too large to be explored in a
single day, it invited visitors to seek out those objects about which they were, for personal
reasons, most curious.
Visitors’ behaviour makes clear that their expectations had little in common with the
goals of the organizers. Primary, they came neither to be instructed about humanity’s
civilizational progress as evolutionary principle nor to inform themselves about the latest
technological achievements. As exhibition visitor Louis Reybaud bluntly put it, they were more
interested in the ‘spectacle’ than in the ‘study’ (Reybaud 1867: 737). They were looking for a
‘learning oriented entertainment experience’ (Falk and Dierking 2000: 87). The public was
fascinated, above all, by the imaginative experiential world of the exhibition park, with its
unexpected juxtaposition of different national pavilions, churches, restaurants, engine rooms,
school buildings, factories and souvenir stalls.
Moreover, many people were anxious to profit from the exhibition in more than the
spiritual sense; the Parisians proved exceptionally adept at sniffing out money making
possibilities around the Champ de Mars. Printers’ shops offering calling cards, umbrellas for
rent, photographic studios and translation bureaus are examples of some of the businesses that
progressively opened within the grounds of the exhibition. Outside the gates, improvised
catalogue-holders and all manner of fake entrance tickets were on offer. In the full-to-
overflowing city, hotel prices increased three or four times over and thousands of Parisians
rented out their apartments at horrendous prices.
The Universal Exhibition, clearly identified as a scientific event through the afterthought
that was the imposition of a sales ban, was thus able to develop into Walter Benjamin’s much
quoted ‘phantasmagoria of capitalist culture’, which one ‘entered in order to divert oneself’
(Benjamin 1983: 50). The entertainment and pleasure facilities, which sprang up like mushrooms
over the course of the summer – the apparently static medium Universal Exhibition thus proving
remarkably dynamic – promised to satisfy the most off-beat wishes of the millions of visitors. The
park, which surrounded the central hall, to which many visitors failed to venture, offered a truly
broad range of attractions, which quickly became the key foci of the exhibition although they had
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in fact rather been intended as places to take a break or as fringe events. Theatres and concert
halls, innumerable restaurants and refreshments stalls, a hot-air balloon, an automatic
parachute, rowing regattas, fencing, chess and billiard tournaments, underground aquaria and
Chang, the Chinese Giant, awaited visitors to an exhibition that had in store additional parties
and fireworks displays almost every evening.
The Universal Exhibition was thus much more than a display of progress. It was a global
media event and in 1867 the undisputed epicentre of Paris, which became, in the wake of this
and future exhibitions, the ‘capital of the nineteenth century’ in the words of contemporary
Maxime du Camp. Events were by no means concentrated solely within the grounds themselves.
The arrivals at the railroad stations of Paris of foreign monarchs who had come to visit the
exhibition, stylized as official receptions, the military parades held in their honour, the grand
awards ceremonies, free entry to the capital’s museums for the duration of the exhibition, the
numerous receptions organized by Parisian personalities, and particularly the various exhibition
annexes, all led to a gradual fusion of city and exhibition. The bearer of this blending was the
enormous mass of over eleven million visitors, which circulated through the city along the
exhibitionary network.
Like Timothy Mitchell, Vanessa Schwartz has convincingly shown the mutual dependence
of the city of Paris and the exhibitions it hosted. Schwartz describes how the rise of a new viewing
of events led to the formation of a new viewing crowd.3 In a city that accommodated five
Universal Exhibitions in forty-five years, each larger and attracting more visitors than the one
before, it was ‘not always easy in Paris to tell where the exhibition ended, and the world itself
began’ (Mitchell 1989: 224). The Universal Exhibition was the archetype of a new, urban space,
marked not so much by a specific infrastructure as produced by a broad mass of common
behavioural and perceptual patterns: ‘[t]he apprehension of urban experience and modern life
through visual re-presentation was a means of forming a new kind of crowd’ (Schwartz 1999:
202). In other words: it became more and more difficult todifferentiate specific groups within the
audience. (Ang 1991: 154)
Thus, the anonymous mass of visitors is scarcely graspable. Furthermore, with a few
exceptions, no statistics or other data are available (Niquette and Buxton 1997; Rancière and
Vauday 1988; Taylor 1999). The burgeoning quantity of visitors tends to obscure their
characteristics. This mass was, above all, something other than the sum of its parts. It was not
the juxtaposition of various classes and genders. It was formed, on the contrary, only in facing
the object of its gaze. It constituted itself as mass in the moment of confrontation with the
exhibition and crumbled when the spectacle observed was no more. The principal trait of the
mass was its anonymity and uniformity at the moment when it came face-to-face with the cause
of its formation. This momentary confrontation in the grounds of the exhibition dissolved such
otherwise decisive differentiating criteria as social position or educational opportunities for the
duration of the perceptual event (Schwartz 1998: 21).
The individual visitor found himself isolated amid the anonymous mass, within which he
could either drift or through which he had to force his way to the exhibits. The mass of visitors
offered itself an ever new, ever changing sight (Rydell 1984: 2). This constantly changing picture
suggests a further reason for the diversity of perceptual practices and observable interpretations.
Not all visitors saw the same exhibition. At the risk of overegging the analytical pudding, one
might say that each visitor saw an exhibition unique to him or her, and fostered its uniqueness
through his or her own interpretation. Individual routes through the exhibition, individual
preferences and previous knowledge, individual expectations and individual moods at the
moment of perception led to individual impressions of the exhibition, to individual readings as
the exhibition as a text (Bal 2007; Ravelli 2006).
Which types of perception arose from this and how can these be described? The issue
of which sources to examine comes to the fore here. The Universal Exhibition did indeed leave
behind a large number of official texts as well as newspaper reports around the world. These
are however of meagre use in attempting to analyze individual impressions in the moment of
confrontation with the exhibits. Official documents, largely composed by those working for the
exhibition, offer detailed descriptions but otherwise little more than endless repetition of the
organizers’ flattering discourse. Press reports must be taken with a hefty pinch of salt, both
because of frequent plagiarism and because of the high level of censorship that marked the
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French Second Empire in general and the exhibition in particular. Press authorization,
conferred with reluctance at the best of times, could be withdrawn at any time without
explanation. Loss of access to this unique event and money making opportunity could have
serious consequences not only for individual journalists but for entire publications. Reporting
was thus highly favourable and no journalist was excluded from the exhibition by the censors.
Le Figaro, which had devoted a daily column to the Exposition universelle, abandoned
coverage on July 27 1867, stating that, despite its noble ideals, the exhibition had degenerated
into an enormous fun fair. But even a moderate press scandal such as this offers little material
for analysis of perceptual practices. The exhibition was indeed a means ‘for inscribing and
broadcasting the messages of power’ (Bennett 1988: 74) and the propaganda pushed by the
Napoleonic regime bore much fruit, as most press reports illustrate. However, brochures and
newspaper texts likewise provide little evidence of the variety of emotions and impressions
bound up with a visit to the exhibition and the forms of perception to which they gave rise.
Personal sources, such as memoirs, diaries or private correspondence, offer far richer
pickings. These shed light on visitors’ specifically individual impressions beyond the organizers’
intentions. The father of Dabot, an exhibition visitor, appeared to find the serious transportation
problems and exhausting jostling of the crowd highly tedious (Dabot 1899: 226). Jules Verne
visited the exhibition not to compare the progress of civilization but to have lunch with his brother
(Dumas 1988: 435).
Visitors’ ways of dealing with what they experienced, as evidenced in these few and far
between sources, were as diverse as the objects and attractions to be found (MacKenzie 2002:
193). However, such testimony is problematic: relevant personal sources come almost
exclusively from artists, intellectuals, scientists or high ranking politicians and are thus hardly
representative of the broader public. It is once again apparent that generalizations about the
perception of the exhibition are impossible. We can merely describe certain perceptual
practices, for which good evidence exists, as interpretive options embedded in the exhibition.
Nonetheless, these certainly represent one component of the exhibition grounds’ historical
reality (Ginzburg 1992: 82-96; Ginzburg 1993).
Eigensinn and mimesis
Visitors’ perception and interpretation are not characterized by linkage of the portrayal with the
world beyond it, but rather by the generation of a plethora of imagined worlds. The Universal
Exhibition of 1867 was a polysemic event in which different structures of signification interacted
simultaneously. The imperative of universality as fundamental exhibitionary concept transformed
the Champ de Mars into a site of a dizzying viewing experience further intensified by the visitors’
perception and imagination.
The idea of simultaneous diversity also underpins Lüdtke’s concept of Eigensinn
mentioned above. He states: ‘[i]ssues of diversity are […] crucial. Issues, to put it more precisely,
of the difference within the simultaneous. This perspective is essential to elucidating the range
of the historically possible’ (Lüdtke 1993: 409). Lüdtke assumes that potential for action can only
be evaluated through detailed depiction of a specific historical situation; he thus calls for a micro-
historical approach.
Eigensinn facilitates the satisfaction of personal interests and emotions beyond rational
societal demands. This concept refers to a strategy that helps the individual to achieve are more
direct contact with the world and is thus concerned with a particular form of appropriation of the
world beyond its mediation through super-ordinate structures.
The exhibition offered people the chance to forget their everyday working lives for a few
hours. It was not solely a matter of political propaganda, a positivist attempt to explicate the
world or a normative model of society – it was also a leisure time activity (Bal 2007: 74; Brooker
and Jermyn (eds) 2003: 231). This spectacular experiential world attracted millions of visitors;
its surprising and unfamiliar diversity was highly appealing. The exhibition was characterized
to a significant degree by a tendency to demand and encourage visitors’ Eigensinn. This usually
took the form of mimetic action rather than resistance against the officially propagated model
of society. Mimesis, as a technique of exchange between person and world, could develop
beyond social necessities and, astonishingly inside an exhibition which intended to depict the
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world, it could also develop independently of the issue of representativity. The concept of
mimesis, which involves making a ‘“copy” of an existing world and using it to help generate one’s
own action’ (Wulf 2002: 1112), appears as a key to grasping visitors’ perceptual practices within
the room for Eigensinn manoeuvre provided by the exhibition. After all, the Universal Exhibition
was precisely such a copy of the world, inviting visitors to interpret. New, specifically individual
realms of imagination were created through their interpretations.
This creative element, neither intended nor foreseen by the organizers, was characteristic
for the exhibition. Bernhard Waldenfels neatly captures this from a phenomenological perspective:
‘[…] because we cannot simply assume that things in themselves clearly are, once-and-for-all,
just what they are, the process of determination entails moments of creation’ (Waldenfels 2000:
63).
Within the grounds of the exhibition, this creation was by no means dependent on the
event’s self-definition. I have attempted on other occasions to describe the process of Eigensinn
and mimetic creation of individual imaginative worlds as a three-stage process of ‘consumption’,
as defined by Colin Campbell (Barth 2003 and 2007b). He refers to ‘consumption as a
voluntaristic, self-directed and creative process in which cultural ideas are necessarily implicated’
(Campbell 1987: 203). Consumption then means hedonistic action that can also be described
as ‘day-dreaming’ or ‘fantasizing’ (Campbell 1987: 77; Ang 1991: 154). ‘What audiences are
doing, therefore, is drawing from the endless media stream that passes them by a set of diverse
elements out of which they can construct imaginative worlds that suite them’ (Abercrombie and
Longhurst 1998: 107).
In the perception phase, the observer becomes aware of the object of consumption, is
fascinated and attracted by it and endows it with qualities he considers positive. He thus paves
the way for the subsequent appropriation of the desired object, which constitutes the second
phase. This action should be understood as cultural in nature: the consumer makes use of
specific options for signification offered by the object and places it in a direct relationship with
his personal opinions, interests and preferences. The positive connotations of the object are
transferred to oneself. Ultimately, the transformational phase involves further creative
development of the object’s discursive sphere, a development that culminates in its inscription
in the identity of the consumer. This identification appears as cultural action rooted in individual
motives.
Paul Ricœur has developed a similar three-phase model in relation to the mimesis of
textual structures, which is relevant to analyses of perceptual practice at the Universal
Exhibition. He describes three distinct mimetic levels which, based on an existing text, enable
the creation of individual imaginative worlds, which characterize the act of reading and make
it comprehensible as action. Mimesis I refers to previous knowledge of narrative structures and
to the reader’s social milieu as indispensable to understanding the text and to constructing a
frame of reference within which structures of signification and interpretive options can develop
(Ricœur 1983: 12). These references form the basis of Mimesis II, whose ‘rupturing function’
and ‘capacity for mediation’ are the precondition for further interpretation (Ricœur 1983: 106).
These inhere in the text as latent options for signification but are not generated automatically;
rather, they must be produced by the reader. Thus, the reader changes the text through the act
of reading just as the visitor changes the exhibition through the act of looking (Ricœur 1983:
107). This is the moment of transition from ‘présupposition’ to ‘transformation’ (Ricœur 1983:
110; italics in the text).
Further creative evolution characterizes Mimesis III, which involves a ‘new configuration
by means of fiction of the order that underlies action’ (Ricœur 1983: 12). Ricœur argues that
each text spreads far-reaching structures of signification before it and that these must be
grasped by the reader if he or she is to understand the text and endow it with meaning (Ricœur
1983: 152). In other writings, Ricœur draws on the work of Northrop Frye, who understands
poetic texts as options for unlocking imaginative worlds. For Frye, ‘the suspension of the actual
reference is the condition for access to reference in a virtual form’ (Ricœur 1975: 288). Ricœur
even goes one step further, calling for ‘the eclipse of a referential mode as condition for the
emergence of another referential mode’ (Ricœur 1975: 301). Readers re-invent the reality that
they perceive as soon as they get caught up in their fictional, imaginative worlds; as he or she
interprets, they inevitably find themself within a social frame of reference that prestructures the
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interpretive possibilities but which does not make this the basis of the individual imaginative
world that they seek. For Ricœur, the interpretation of a text is ‘the proposition of a world that
I might inhabit and in which I might project the powers most specific to me’ (Ricœur 1983: 152),
in other words, the space of Eigensinn described by Lüdtke.
In the context of the Universal Exhibition of 1867 the act of reading and interpretation
can be portrayed through the example of exhibition attendee Hans Christian Andersen, who
eternalized the event in a highly personal manner in his fairytale The dryad. A wood nymph,
determined to see the exhibition despite a prediction that her life will last only half a day if she
does so, sets things in motion. On the way to the Champ de Mars, the dryad passes by the
revamped Parisian catacombs, opened for the duration of the exhibition, a place inscribed in
its discursive sphere.
Andersen gradually introduces a whole series of specific exhibition-related motifs. He
transforms the event, however, from a scientific display of progress into a ‘wonder of the world’
(Andersen 1992: 1031). Through the figure of the nymph and the creatures she meets in the
wonderland of the Champ de Mars, he describes the exhibition from the animals’ point of view
and questions the motives of the human beings who created it. The fairytale culminates in the
nymph’s visit to the aquaria, which are depicted from the fishes’ perspective. On the other side
of the glass, the silent denizens of the aquarium are not only object to be looked at, but are
themselves looking:
They had come to see the Exhibition, they saw it from their fresh or salt water
abode, they saw the teeming human mass passing by from morning to evening.
All the countries of the world had sent and put on display their representatives
so that the elderly tench and bream, the agile perch and the tattered carp could
see these creatures and express their opinion of this space. (Andersen 1992:
1042-3)
Andersen is interested in the exhibitionary world, he is fascinated by it, gets caught up in and
devotes himself to it. This he does, not to praise the Second Empire or pay homage to universal
progress, but by instrumentalizing, interpreting and reshaping the exhibition in line with his
interests as author and artist. Rooted in his knowledge of the object, he develops an individual
fiction on the basis of personal preferences and convictions. He does not reproduce the world
of the exhibition but merely uses it as a frame of reference to create an individual and unique
imaginative world. The original reference fades and is replaced with a new context of
signification that remoulds the appropriated object into an entirely new semantic structure.
Thus, Andersen’s fairytale is an example of Eigensinn, mimetic appropriation and the individual
transformation of the exhibition for purposes that bear no relation to its original goals.
Conclusion
Robert Rydell und Nancy Gwinn have rightly highlighted the problem of perception in analyzing
historical exhibitions. They ask rhetorically: ‘Is it correct to regard fairgoers as sponges, awash
in a sea of overlaying and reinforcing ideological meanings, absorbing messages presented to
them?’ (Rydell and Gwinn 1994: 4).4  While it is crucial to examine the organizers’ ideological
aims, this in itself is no sure guide to visitors’ experience of the exhibition; we cannot assume
that they simply soak up the organizers’ self-promoting propaganda. The French organizers
certainly made use of the Exposition universelle de 1867 both to fix France’s status as a world
power and to construe it anew.A brief review of the perceptual practices of the visitors lays bare,
however, that while their efforts were recognized and often appreciated, they rarely informed
visitors’ evaluation of the exhibition. This event was a miniature, utopian version of the world,
but by no means its reflection. It was rather a model featuring several autonomous structures
of signification, a model that functioned largely independently of the allegedly representative
depiction of reality common to all people. The key, if one wishes to avoid preemptively declaring
the Universal Exhibition a representative token of its age or symbol of a dawning modernity, is
to trace out these very structures.
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Notes
1 All translations in this paper are mine.
2 ‘Things appear as independent actors on the historical scene’ (Richards (1990), 11). Cf. as
well Purbrick (2001), 18-9.
3 ‘Paris did not merely host exhibitions, it had become one’ (Schwartz 1999: 1).
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